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Distinguishing between science of religions and dialogue of religions
The purpose of this paper is to consider some of the ways in which the scientific study of religions1
might have implications for the continuing process of dialogue between religions. While the study
of religions itself is a non-religious activity, the dialogue between religions, on the other hand,
certainly is in some sense a religious activity. It involves the presentation and exchange of religious
experiences and religious positions. It is possible for such dialogues to take place without reference
to the study of religions. However it is possible that those involved in such dialogues might benefit
from the perspectives opened up in the scientific study of religions. The present paper, based on a
lecture given at Ôtani University in Kyôto, makes some suggestions in this direction.2
Since the study of religions is in principle a non-religious, scientific undertaking, it does not, as a
secular enterprise, promote or take part in religious programmes. This may seem to suggest that
there is not and should not be any relationship between the study of religions and dialogue between
religions. From one point of view this is correct. How can "the study of religions" have anything to
do with any dialogues between religions at all, apart from simply observing them? It would be easy
for specialists in the study of religions simply to withdraw from the arena of public discussion. This
would have a certain legitimacy, and some specialists may prefer to adopt that course. However, if
we are not oblivious to the human situation as a whole, and if we take the totality of society and
culture seriously, perhaps something more should be expected, even from specialists.
If we take a strict view of the "science of religions" we might adopt the statement of the eighteenth
century Japanese thinker Tominaga Nakamoto at the end of chapter 24 of Shutsujôkôgo, where he
says "I am not a follower of Confucianism, nor of Taoism, nor Buddhism. I watch their words and
deeds from the side and then privately debate them." (Emerging from Meditation, p.168) In
principle I agree with this view. Only a science of religion which is independent of particular
religious viewpoints can be expected to carry out steady, systematic observation and provide a
worthwhile analysis of religious systems (c.f. for example, Pye 1994, 1999, 2000(a), 2000(b)).
"Observation" here does not merely mean "looking". Rather it implies looking with a view to
1 In German there is the more compact term Religionswissenschaft, which is what meant here, and this is usually
rendered in Japanese as shûkyôgaku.
2 The lecture was first delivered in Japanese on the basis of bilingual notes on 30th October 2000. The present text was
finalised in English and subsequently translated into Japanese, a labour for which the author is very grateful. Thanks
are also due to the organisers of the lecture and seminar programme, in which Gerhard Marcel Martin from Marburg
also participated. The programme was conceived as a continuation of the 3rd Rudolf Otto Symposium held in
Marburg 1999, which is mentioned again in the discussion below.
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understanding, analysing and explaining. In other words it implies the full range of "scientific"
reflection in relation to the particular field of religious systems. While this is not the place to
provide a general introduction to the methods and theory of the study of religions, it may be helpful






(subsequent theory)Of these the first two steps are "recognitional", that is to say, they are concerned
with perceiving and understanding religious phenomena. The second two are "explanatory", that is,
they explain both by means of an analysis of internal structures (step 3) and by establishing
correlations with other social and cultural factors (step 4). While moving through these four steps
both the relevance of comparison and the possibility of tension with the believers increases. This is
referred to as the "tension with believers factor" (TWB factor, see Pye 1999). It is important for
those who study religions to be aware of the increasing level of this "tension with believers factor".
If it is high during the recognitional steps, there is something wrong with the method of enquiry. If it
is untypically low during the explanatory steps, this may suggest that the explanations are weak or it
may suggest something interesting about the nature of the religion under study.
It is important therefore clearly to distinguish between the activity of carrying out religious
dialogues and the activity of studying religions as systems. Religious dialogues may be part of the
field of study. Because of the complexity of the field of study, which is not only a historical field but
also a living, active part of contemporary culture, it is natural for the specialist to be drawn close to
the events of the day, in a sense to participate in them. This is an opportunity for participant
observation, and sometimes even of observant participation. However it is also possible, and indeed
probable, that some of the theoretical perspectives of the study of religions could be relevant to the
future progress of dialogues between religions. In the next section therefore a few reasons will be
adduced for encouraging a close proximity between the study of religions and the various activities
of religious dialogue.
2
Marburg Journal of Religion: Volume 6, No. 2 (June 2001)
Why is the study of religions relevant to the dialogue of religions?
The representatives of various religious organisations who engage in dialogues with each other are
usually most sincere and respectful in their approach. However, even with the best of intentions it is
possible for misunderstandings to occur. How can a real dialogue between religions come about
unless accurate information and instructive analysis is available? It may be helpful therefore if
specialists in the study of religions are permitted in some way to share in dialogue events when they
take place. Even though they do not represent a particular religion, they may nevertheless be able to
assist in the work of elucidation and analysis. Thus their participation may help to stabilise and
facilitate the process of dialogue in particular situations.
What sometimes happens is that the sensitive participants in a dialogue between religions, after
making their first contact, in effect leave their committed positions to one side and begin to take up
the study of religions for themselves. They realise and understand that accurate and reliable
knowledge is required, not only about their own religion, but about the other religion also. They
may also press forward to a comparative analysis. Dietrich Korsch, for example, a systematic
theologian participating in the 1999 Symposium in Marburg between Shin Buddhism and Protestant
Theology, noticed that it would be interesting to analyse comparatively the formal structures of
different religions (Barth/Minoura/Pye 2000, 163-164). Since such an analysis would be
independent of the specific details of the belief contents of any particular religion, it amounts to a
reinvention of the science of religion, or at least of part of it. It would be similar to what I have
called "comparative hermeneutics" (Morgan and Pye 1973), and more generally it would be related
to the analysis of the dynamics of religious tradition, on which see further below.
Of course, this process of analysis does not always take place. In some cases, after an initial
exploration, a concluding solution is found by dialogue partners which simply favours the "home"
religion. In that case no further information is really perceived to be necessary. In other words the
religious position becomes dominant again, and the "study of religions" is left to one side. If a
person has faith in the name of Jesus, for example, why should he or she be interested in studying
various religions and analysing their similarities? It will probably seem to such a person to be more
valuable to emphasise difference. The same thought may occur to a person who has faith in Amida's
fundamental vow (hongan). However, while such simple faith may be necessary, and even
sufficient, for living and dying, the questions of reason remain, even if they are secondary questions.
Thus, as soon as we begin to think about it all, the study of religions in a comparative perspective
arises inevitably once again.
Finally, and not least, important social and political discussions about the legal position of various
religions are being carried out today as never before, although these discussions also have a
considerable history. Should historically strong religions like Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or
Shinto have a privileged position in society or not? If so, what about newer, smaller religious groups
and movements, of which there are very many. Should these even be permitted to exist? Religions
which have come under criticism recently from this point of view are Aum Shinrikyô (in Japan),
Scientology (in Germany) and Falungong (in China). These have all been regarded, with greater or
less evidence being adduced, as threatening to undermine established society. At the time of their
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origins the same was said with regard to Buddhism and Christianity. Of course, all of these religions
are not just the same as each other. Moreover some cause more social disruption and suffering than
others. But how will social commentators, journalists and politicians be able to discuss these
matters properly unless they have clear and reliable information about the various religions in
question? For this, the study of religions is necessary.
With all this in mind, it appears that it would be valuable for those engaged in religious dialogues to
take the study of religions seriously and to assist in its development. This is not because specialists
in the study of religions necessarily have more knowledge at their disposal. In fact, when a
specialised dialogue is taking place the representatives on each side are almost certain to have more
specialised knowledge, at least about their own side. In wider discussions, however, the study of
religions may be able to provide a theoretical reference point which can be shared by those who
otherwise have different religious or other convictions.
A shared presupposition
A most important underlying presupposition which is shared by the scientific study of religions and
all forms of religious dialogue, different though these are, is the perception of the plurality of
religions. Significantly, it was one of the starting points for the European Enlightenment's reflection
about religion, and at the same time for the eighteenth century Japanese thinker Tominaga
Nakamoto, mentioned above. It is significant that the quotation given earlier is drawn from his
chapter on the "three teachings", an expression which symbolises the plurality of religions. In the
study of religions itself, therefore, the perception of the plurality of religons is not problematic. It is
a natural state of affairs.
This presupposition can be seen in a discussion paper by sociologist of religion Peter Berger,
published in the first issue of Buddhist-Christian Studies under the title "The pluralistic situation
and the coming dialogue between the world religions" (1981, 31-41). His concluding question was
how two religions, such as Buddhism and Christianity, can be "true together"? This question
replaces the older western question about which religion is true and why. However we should not
get carried away here by the idea that there might be an easy solution. Even if some Buddhists and
some Christians agree on a selected "something", there are so many religions in the world as a
whole that it is difficult to see how they can all be true "together" unless the statements which they
make, or which arise by implication, are relatively meaningless. So there remains an open
philosophical question about the nature of truth claims in religion and the criteria by which it might
be meaningful to assess them. While the scientific study of religions is not directly concerned with
the philosophical assessment of truth claims advanced by religions, it may be able to assist in their
identification and clarification.
Although the same presupposition underlies many well-meaning approaches to religious dialogue or
"inter-faith" programmes, the perception of the plurality of religions may seem to be problematic
from the point of view of religious conviction or commitment. This is because the existence of
diverse religious orientations may seem to relativise the truth or value of the "home" religion,
thereby creating danger. In other religious understandings, however, the plurality of religions is not
regarded as a problem because the final truth is simply regarded as going beyond them all. Thus
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historically, the emergence of the comparative study of religions (in their plurality) has often been
associated with the view that there is a common principle or essence underlying them all. Nowadays
however this idea is widely regarded as a blind alley. As a result, thinking about the plurality of
religions separates into two directions. In connection with the scientific study of religions, the unity
of religions is not even necessarily regarded as a reality, and certainly not as an objective. The study
of religions concentrates on the analysis of religions, while dialogue between religions concentrates
on mutual understanding, coexistence and cooperation. These relations can be shown by means of a
simple flow-chart, as follows.
5
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Religious solutions to the perception of plurality
At this point, looking at it from an observer's point of view, it will be helpful to note that there are
various ways in which dialogue between religions has been approached by religiously oriented
people. Some of these are highly organised and some are rather informal. While in general the
sincerity of the participants need not be questioned there may be a multiple motivation. Sometimes,
for example, an important function is to achieve a public relations effect within their own religious
community.
First, well established religious organisations discover, on the margins of their institutions, that
there is a problem of correlation with so-called "other" religions. This problem is sometimes
addressed negatively and polemically, and sometimes constructively and cooperatively. As a result
there is a tradition of writing, especially in Christian theology, about the relationship between
Christianity and "other faiths". Often, the question of how to think about the "other" religions is left
to a secondary, relatively unimportant position in the theological system. This habit of thinking has
occasionally been criticised by those who study the general history of religions (Smart 1962, Pye
1976, 1979). Usually there is a clear conception of the religion which forms the starting point, and a
less clear understanding of the "other" religions which have to be taken into account. This holds
good both for those with a negative view of  the religions (e.g. Karl Barth) and in some cases for
those who take a more positive view (e.g. Hans Küng). In any case the attempt is made, perhaps
understandably enough, somehow to fit the various "other" religions into the worldview of the
starting point. 
It is of course not only the Christian tradition which has produced reflection upon its own
procedures in this regard. Consider for example the instructive title The Buddhist Philosophy of
Assimilation. The Historical Development of the Honji Suijaku Theory (Matsunaga 1969), in which
the thought processes leading up to that particular solution are studied in detail. Various attempts
have been made to chart systematically the options which are available in the correlation of an
"own" tradition with an "other" tradition, a recent substantial study being that by Andreas
Grünschloss in Der eigene und der fremde Glaube (1999). While this work addresses a theological
audience in some parts (and indeed the author describes himself as a Grenzgänger, that is, a
frontier-crosser) the main intention is to analyse possible positions and procedures on the basis of
the observation of several religions.
Second, there are more recently founded religions which, from their very inception, have a point of
view about the integration or mutual harmony of existing religions The Japanese religion Ananaikyô
may be mentioned as an example. Other examples which are globally active are the Unification
Church which originated in Korea and the Baha'i religion, which originated in Iran. Such religions
start out with a view about the relationship between various religions for the simple reason that at
the time of their conception it is evident that there already are other well organised religions in
existence. It is therefore a natural, almost a necessary requirement to say what part these play in the
new message. Interestingly, although there are quite a lot of religions which somehow assert "the
unity" of all religions, they do not usually cooperate with each other. On the contrary they continue
to offer a distinctive, superior message.
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Third, there are several interreligious or "interfaith" organisations which operate independently of
the institutionalised religions, e.g. the World Congress of Faiths, the World's Parliament of
Religions, and the recently founded United Religions. In general these organisations are supported
by individuals who themselves have an extremely positive attitude towards the various religions of
the world. In fact there is quite a long history of such "interfaith organisations". Indeed, in view of
the rapid development of global consciousness in the twentieth century it is perhaps surprising that
these organisations are not even stronger than they are. There are various possible reasons for this.
For one thing, the activists who support them either come from small religious groups themselves,
like the Brahma Kumaris active in the International Interfaith Centre at Oxford, England, or they are
non-typical members of larger religions, e.g. Anglican or Catholic priests acting with at best very
tenuous hierarchical legitimation for their interfaith work. Moreover the various interfaith
movements to some extent compete with each other as organisations, each with their own leaders
and characteristic interests.
Fourth, there have been a small number of clearly organised dialogues between truly representative
groups from established religions. Such dialogues are very demanding, for the simple reason that
there is a very strong sense of responsibility to the specific religious traditions concerned,  together
with a real need for new knowledge and new awareness of the partner tradition. This pattern may
turn out to be more significant, in the long run, than has usually been recognised. Let two such
dialogues be briefly noted here as examples.
The first example is a well-structured meeting between Tenrikyô and Catholicism, held at the
Gregorian University in Rome 1998. This was accompanied by an informative exhibition about the
Tenrikyô religion. The proceedings were published shortly afterwards (Tenrikyô ). While the
contents of the discussions were serious, it cannot be disputed that the relative organisational
strength of the two religions is very different. The dialogue itself did not seem to be one-sided at the
time. However, as the participants themselves were certainly aware, there is a considerable
imbalance of size between these two dialogue partners. Because of this, the significance of the
dialogue for the Tenrikyô side was considerably greater than it was for the Catholic side. The vast
majority of Catholics, even of clergy and teachers, will probably never hear that this dialogue took
place, whereas on the Tenrikyô side it is much better known. As an additional feature, it may be
noted that the joint organisers of this dialogue conference consciously sought the participation of
four specialists in the study of religions, who not only produced their own papers but also
moderated some of the discussions.3
A recent dialogue with a similar structure was that conducted between representatives of Jôdo
Shinshû, mainly but not exclusively from Ôtani University, Kyôto, and representatives of the
Faculty of Protestant Theology of the University of Marburg. This took place in Marburg in the
spring of 1999. The special feature of this dialogue is that it was already well known, in the
background, that there are most interesting structural similarities in the structures of faith, belief and
practice between these two religions. It must be said that the intellectual level of the contributions
from both sides was very demanding. This meant that great efforts had to be made as far as
3 The four were: Martin Kraatz (Marburg), Johannes Laube (München), Michael Pye (Marburg) and Ninian Smart
(Santa Barbara).
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linguistic translation and interpretation are concerned. It also meant that a serious process of getting
to know the other tradition was set in motion, which would not otherwise have occurred for most of
the participants. The event was accompanied not only by an exhibition of books and scrolls
pertaining to Shin Buddhism, but also by a gongyô service carried out by representatives of the
Higashi Honganji in the festive lecture hall (the "Alte Aula") of the university. Needless to say, this
dialogue is part of a long and complex interaction between Buddhism and Christianity which has
been documented and discussed in some detail by writers such as John D'Arcy May (1984), Michael
von Brück and Whalen-Lai (1997) and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (1992). However a special feature of
this particular case is that the dialogue took place between representative groups, probably for the
first time between these two well balanced dialogue partners. It may also be noted that in this case,
too, a mediatory function was carried out by specialists in the study of religions. The documentation
of this Marburg dialogue has been published both in German and in Japanese (Barth/Minoura/Pye
2000).
We can see from these examples that it is possible, and indeed desirable, for "the study of religions"
to maintain its independent character, even while specialists take part in the complex situation of
dialogues.
Dominant models of religion dependent on cultural difference
There are various ways in which the leading features of religions, as studied independently, should
be taken into account in the context of dialogues between religions. Some of these features are a
function of cultural difference. Others arise unavoidably out of the systematic and comparative
analysis of religions. It is the very purpose of the scientific study of religion to develop such models
which should be relevant in various different cultures. These features are therefore regular, rather
than culturally diverse. First, however, let it be recognised that, in the various cultural regions of the
world, dominant models of religion are current which are not the same. These models, though sub-
scientific, are very influential.
A more detailed account of such models has been attempted elsewhere, and only a few summary
details will be given here.4 In Latin America, for example, we have an evident juxtaposition of
Catholicism on the one hand and pre-conquest religious systems and elements thereof on the other
hand. The interaction between these two has provided a classic model for studies of religion in Latin
America, whether they have been approached from a religious (Catholic) point of view or an
"anthropological" point of view. Now consider the main parameters in western Europe. They are
different. Catholicism and anti-catholic secularism on the one hand and Protestantism and post-
protestant secularism on the other hand provide the basic map. Recent phenomena such as New Age
religiosity are always considered against this background. Turning now to Africa, the time when it
was presumed that "Africans" were simply without religion altogether has now long passed.
Nowadays a four-fold pattern is widely presupposed consisting of indigenous religions, commonly
referred to as "African traditional religions", secondly Christianity in its Roman Catholic and World
Council of Churches forms, thirdly Islam, and fourthly African independent religions which have
4 The two following paragraphs are abbreviated from a more detailed treatment of this subject under the title
"Difference and coherence in the worldwide study of religions", a lecture delivered at Boston University and due for
publication elsewhere.
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arisen in response to the colonial and missionary period. These are the ever-recurring elements
among the subjects chosen for study not only by Africanists in general, but more importantly by
specialists on religion working within Africa, by Africans and non-Africans alike. This already
gives three different models of religion which are deeply rooted in the cultures concerned.
In Asia it is notable that the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty in China decided to develop a policy
on religion and therefore set about defining its contours with the help of a short treatise on the
subject, the Sanjiaolun. Beginning with the already well established idea of the "three teachings"
(that is, Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism) he also took account of three other elements in the
total pattern. These were the rites of the state, the general belief in a network of gods and spirits
providing support for the teachings of Buddhism and Daoism, and lastly teachings which lead
people astray and which are therefore to be forbidden. To this model we may add the veneration of
ancestors, which provides the main subject matter for de Groot's famous treatement of what he
called The Religious System of China (1892). In various forms this model has persisted in the
various East Asian states influenced by the Chinese literary, intellectual and political tradition. One
of the main features of this model is that political registration and in some cases control of religions
have an established history. By contrast, for example, this is not the case in Brazil. The political
importance of the East Asian model definitely has an effect on what many scholars in those
countries think they are studying. In Japan, for example, specialists in religion are always familiar
with the yearbook of statistics (Shûkyô Nenkan) and other registration material published by the
Ministry of Education (Monbushô). It contributes, as an underlying assumption, to the
determination of their field of study.
These models may seem to be very simplified. However the point is precisely that such underlying
models indeed are very simple. The persons taking part in dialogues between religions need to be
aware of the persistent features of the dominant model of religion in their own cultural area. For
example, representatives of Shin Buddhism, or those who enter into dialogue with them, should
remember that the veneration or care of ancestors is a permanent feature of the dominant religious
model in Japan. It may not be a significant part of Shin Buddhist doctrine. Neverthless, unlike
prayers for this-worldy benefits (genzeriyaku), which are rejected on doctrinal grounds, the
veneration of ancestors is accepted in the context of Shin Buddhism as a normal part of religious
activity.
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On taking account of all four main aspects of religion
The scientific study of religions attempts to make field analyses in which many more elements are
taken into account, and which are therefore more complex than the dominant cultural models
mentioned above, at least at the descriptive level. On the other hand it also seeks to develop unified
analytical models which are relevant in the various different cultures. Here, once again, simplicity is
sought. But this should be the simplicity of science, not the simplicity of cultural assumptions.
As a starting point let us take the general morphology of religion. It has often been pointed out that
religion is not only a matter of the head, or for that matter of the heart, and that there are other
aspects which need to be taken into account. Looking at the morphology of religion from the
standpoint of the general study of religions, it will prove correct to delineate four main aspects
which need to be considered in every case, namely the conceptual or symbolic, the subjective or
affective, the behavioural and the social. Each of these stands in some relationship to the others, as I
have explained in more detail at various times (Pye 1972, 1994).
Unfortunately, even well known theorists of religion sometimes completely ignore one or other of
these aspects. The five dimensions of religion referred to by Stark and Glock (1968) for example,
and often quoted by others, completely omit the social aspect. Alternatively, too many aspects or
dimensions are differentiated, thus confusing the picture. Thus Glock and Stark in the same work
propose both a "belief dimension" and a "knowledge dimension", which both clearly involve
conceptual elements. The distinction between "belief" and "knowledge" therefore, admitted by them
to be close, should be relegated to a secondary level. It is in any case problematic because it arises
out of a particular problem characteristic of the western tradition in the philosophy of religion and
has no interculturally convincing base. It would lead to far afield to discuss here the many
competing accounts of "dimensions" or aspects of religion. Summarily stated, as far as the general
study of religions is concerned, there really does not seem to be any reason for departing from a
perception of religious systems which takes each of the four main aspects of religion into account.
Any further differentiation should be left to a secondary stage in the analysis.
The point to note here is that these four main aspects, in so far as they provide a stable and
comprehensive morphological starting point for specialists in the study of religions, also should be
taken seriously by participants in religious dialogues. In other words, dialogue is not only in the
head. There is, secondly, an affective aspect also. Thirdly, it is also possible to carry out dialogue
"by doing", for example by taking part in joint meditation exercises or social welfare activity.
Finally, the dialogue will be carried out by persons who in some ways stand in a social relationship
of some kind, whether it is highly official or relatively tenuous. It is not possible to take examples of
all these aspects here. Let the point be illustrated, most briefly, with reference to the dialogue
between Shin Buddhism and Protestant Christianity.
Most frequently, interest has been shown in the various ways in which the conceptual apparatus of
the two traditions can be understood. In particular the idea is current that modes of thinking might
be transferred from one tradition to the other in a fruitful way. It has been argued, for example, that
the concept of demythologisation can be transferred from debates in Christian theology to the
interpretation of the figure of Amida Buddha and the Pure Land. What do "mythological" concepts
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mean existentially? In the other direction the suggestion has been discussed that the idea of skilful
means might be transferred from Buddhism to Christianity (Pye 1990, 1998, Sharma 1990, Hick
1993). It has also been suggested, during the Marburg symposium, that a "deontologisation" of
leading concepts might be undertaken, such as is familiar in Mahayana Buddhism, but which has
hitherto been viewed with more caution in Christianity. These are matters for discussion by experts
in the two traditions. However it would appear that an active development of ideas in these two
directions would lead to a much closer mutual appreciation developing between the intellectual
representatives of the two traditions. What should be noticed however is that it would probably also
lead to a shift in the affective aspect on both sides. That is to say, people would begin to feel
differently about the symbolic systems with which they are familiar. They would, possibly, develop
a different kind of "religiosity", to use the psychologists' term.
But what about the other aspects? What about entering into a dialogue of behaviour, or a dialogue of
institutional relationships? This of course is not easy, though the history of religious dialogues is
full of examples. Some things may seem to be possible, like joint meditation between Zen
Buddhists and Catholics, but others not, like joint recitation of the nenbutsu or joint participation in
a eucharistic service. One of the regular practices carried out at the Higashi Honganji by the
believers (monto) is a cleaning programme, understood to be a religious activity expressing
gratitude. Perhaps it would be conceivable for a group of believers from the Protestant church in
Hessen to visit Japan and assist in this activity! That would be an example of dialogue "by doing",
representing the the aspect of religious behaviour.
These of course are only illustrations. The main, underlying point is that in so far as the scientific
study of religion seeks a balanced view of the phenomena under study by taking account of each of
the four main aspects, then the same stable view may be used as a resource and as a corrective in the
planning of religious dialogues.
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Primal religions and critical religions
Let us now turn to a fundamental distinction in the typology of religions which appears to command
a certain assent. This, too, has implications for dialogues between religions. Though the same
general distinction may be current under varied terminology, the terms "primal" and "critical" are
preferred here. "Critical religions" is a term used to include the sub-categories of soteriological,
awareness and guidance religions, avoiding an undue emphasis on only one of these sub-categories.
The point is simply that a "critical" religion distances itself in some way from the accepted religious
culture of the time, creating a difference. To illustrate with simple examples, Buddhism is a critical
form of religion over against Brahmanism (i.e. the "Hinduism" of the period in which Buddhism
arose), Christianity is a critical form of religion over against Judaism, Islam is a critical form of
religion over against pre-Muslim polytheism, and Konkôkyô or Tenrikyô are critical forms of
religion over against Shintô. This does not mean, as far as the study of religions is concerned, that
either the critical or the primal forms of religion are to be preferred. They are simply different types
of religions which can be noted in the general history of religions. However, it will be evident that it
does not make sense to speak loosely of "dialogue between world religions" as if all religions were
simply the same kind of thing. There really are different kinds of religions. Following this
uncontroversial typology, the question arises whether there is a particular relation between the main
types of religions and the kinds of dialogue which take place or which might be expected. There
seems to be! Let us look at the possible relations in a simplified way. At this point borderline cases
and cases where religions switch from one type to the other will be disregarded. The three standard
relations are
(1) primal-to-primal (parallels and selected contemporary themes)
(2) primal-to-critical (critical points and selected contemporary themes)
(3) critical-to-critical (parallels and selected contemporary themes)
First, then, there might be a dialogue between "primal religions". This could involve two or more of,
for example, the religion of North American Indians, of the Saami of Lapland, Yakutian shamanism
and Japanese Shintô. Of course there are many differences here because Shintô, in particular, has
undergone an immensely complicated development in connection with modernisation processes.
However there is not really any question of alternative truth claims. Rather, such religious systems
are the primal religions of different peoples. So their representatives and even their researchers are
able to enjoy having conversations and making comparative studies of, for example, the North
American "sweat lodge", the Finnish "sauna" and the Japanese "o-furo" (Jetsonen and Pentikäinen
2000).
The second typical dialogue relation would be between primal religion(s) and critical religion(s).
Such relations can be either cooperative or competitive. In the history of religions a sharing of
functions can often be seen, the classic case for this being the history of Buddhism. The
development of an intellectually reflective process about this, which is the beginning of "dialogue",
may be somewhat onesided. For example more thought has been put into these questions from the
Buddhist side of things than by those engaging in the worship of local spirits in South East Asia.
Moreover the relationship, or dialogue, between critical and primal religions can be quite
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competitive, especially if the particularist aspect of primal religions is strongly criticised from the
universalist standpoint of a salvationist religion. An example of this is the relationship between
Christianity and Shintô in Japan, in which Shintô is usually criticised from the Christian side.
However there may be new possibilities for positive dialogue here, especially if thematic subjects
such as environmental questions and problems in medical ethics are considered.
The third typical relation would be between two "critical" religions. This can of course be very
competitive but it can also lead to a dialogue between similar partners, even if they are not equal in
all respects. Examples are the dialogues mentioned above between Tenrikyô and Catholicism and
between Shin Buddhism and German Protestant theology, where strong analytical parallels have
been noted. There has also been a wide range of common interests and common themes, such as
meditation, mysticism and ethical questions. The competitive aspect might be expected to be high
when the organisational interest is high (c.f. below on different kinds of organisation), and yet this
must not always be the case. A clear organisation can also lead to an effective dialogue, effective at
least in the sense that a significant learning process can take place.
Dynamics, innovation - and dialogues
Religious systems, or religious cultures, are not just fixed entities but are subject to change for
various reasons. Quite apart from the influence of external factors there is an innovative dimension
to religion which takes various forms. This means that reinterpretations are unavoidable, and to
some extent it may be part of the process of religious dialogue. It may therefore be important for
participants in religious dialogues to be aware of the processes of change, reinterpretation and
adaptation. This raises the whole subject of the dynamics of religion, in which there are many sub-
problems which cannot detain us here.
In brief, it seems that it might be of interest, even of importance, for participants in religious
dialogues to reflect on their own position in the religious dynamics which are current at any one
time. Not all religious systems move at the same speed with respect to adaptive changes, and
different parties within the same religion also move at different speeds. While it is obvious to the
observer that every religious group includes both conservatives and reformers or liberals, it is
possible that this is not merely because people tend to disagree about the speed of change, but
because the system as a whole requires all of these parties. This needs to be understood in the
situation of religious dialogues.
In this connection I would like to draw attention in particular to the feature of innovation in
religions, which is part of the wider field of the dynamics of religion mentioned immediately above.
In a recent attempt to provide a general theory of religious innovation I have delineated four main
modes of innovation in religion, as follows.5
a)      innovation within the norms of current organisations
b)      innovative reform leading to organisational separation
c)      innovation with difference, but without clear organisational consequences
5 Forthcoming, under the title "Elements of a general theory of innovation in religion".
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d)      innovation with difference, including new organisational forms
The second mode leads to schismatic religious bodies or sects, in the classical sense of the term,
while the fourth mode leads to new religions. This classification is probably not controversial.
However, the implication for religious dialogues is that the third mode of religious innovation is,
from an institutional point of view, relatively irresponsible. This is because it is precisely not
institutional. As an example of this third mode we may adduce much of the innovative religious
culture which goes under the name of "New Age" or new "spirituality". A significant proportion of
the population of industrial or post-industrial societies participates in such activities. This represents
a considerable challenge for the understanding of religious dialogues or for the analysis of the
various options available.
It seems that in considering the relevance of innovation to religious dialogues a typology of relative
institutionalisation is required. At one end might be the Vatican or some other clear-cut
ecclesiastical institutions, and at the other end there might be rather unclearly organised
contributions to religious culture in the New Age style, as referred to above. More structured
dialogue may be expected to be carried out by the representatives of institutions, while less
structured dialogue is carried out between individuals as the bearers of non-institutional elements of
religious culture. Can religious dialogues be carried on by more or less independent or even isolated
individuals? Perhaps in some ways they can. On the other hand, dialogue may seem to be more
serious, and more binding, when there is some kind of institutional social structure to the dialogue,
as in the organised dialogues at Rome and at Marburg which were mentioned earlier. In short, the
question is, who has the right to carry out a dialogue on the part of whom? Unfortunately the
answers to this are not simple. Perhaps they are inevitably endless.
A distinction may also be made between "hard" dialogue and "soft" dialogue. It became clear, in the
discussion held in Kyôto following this lecture, that in general people are not prepared to be
identified with "hard" dialogue. Rather, even while standing firmly in a specific religious tradition,
they prefer to think of themselves as taking part in "soft" dialogue. Consequently, even though there
really are quite clear and strong institutions in the background, such as the Higashi Honganji for
Shin Buddhism, or the German Protestant Church (Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands), it seems
best to preserve the terms "hard" and "soft" for attitudes rather than for relative institutionalisation.
In this usage, therefore, "hard" dialogue would be self-presentational, uncompromising and in the
end unproductive. On the other hand, "soft" dialogue might be understood to be gentle, patient,
imaginative and creative, leaving many questions open for future consideration. It is quite possible
for those representing institutions to be gentle and creative, in other words to engage in "soft"
dialogue.
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Conclusion
The subject of religious dialogues has been approached above from the perspective of the study of
religions, and the opportunity has been taken to make various suggestions. While there is a need to
distinguish clearly between the study of religions and the carrying out of religious dialogues, there
seem to be many ways in which the former can be of assistance for the latter. Those who represent
religious traditions in dialogue situations should therefore take account of the theoretical
perspectives and tasks of the study of religions. They may even wish to contribute to its further
developoment. Specialists in the study of religions, for their part, may feel free to participate in
contemporary discussions, while maintaining a clear view of their academic discipline.
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